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I. Introduction 
As a result of one potentially inadvertent sentence in a 1942 Supreme Court opinion,
1
 
commercial speech has been plagued with second-class status within the First Amendment.
2
  
After receiving no First Amendment protection for over three decades, commercial speech 
finally entered the realm of constitutional protection in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.
3
  Years later, the Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York
4
 established a 
four-part balancing test to assess validity of governmental regulations on commercial speech.
5
  
While courts have uniformly applied the Central Hudson test to commercial speech regulations, 
the outcomes of the analyses have proven to be anything but uniform.
6
 
No area of commercial speech has better displayed the stark contrast in judicial review 
under Central Hudson than vice advertising. Vice advertising, as used throughout this Comment, 
refers to the promotion of products or activities that are legal but may pose a threat to the health 
and morals of the public.
7
  The Court has done an about-face in its evaluation of vice advertising 
restrictions, casually deferring to the government’s discretion in the earliest cases and rigorously 
                                                
1 Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech? 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 629 (1990) (opining 
that the Court “plucked the commercial speech doctrine out of thin air”). See also infra Part II.A. 
2 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980) (“This Court's decisions on 
commercial expression have rested on the premise that such speech, although meriting some protection, is of less 
constitutional moment than other forms of speech.”). 
3 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
4 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
5 Id. at 566. 
6 See e.g., Michael Hoefges, Protecting Tobacco Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: The 
Constitutional Impact of Lorillard Tobacco Co., 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 267, 267-68 (2003) (stating that the Court has 
been applying Central Hudson with “varying degrees of rigor” to commercial speech); Arlen W. Langvardt, The 
Incremental Strengthening of First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech: Lessons From Greater New 
Orleans Broadcasting, 37 AM. BUS. L. J. 587, 588-589 (2000) (“[T]he Court's decisions have offered inconsistent 
signals about the intensity--or lack of intensity--of the First Amendment protection for commercial speech.”); Robert 
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (“Lacking firm jurisprudential 
foundations, commercial speech doctrine has veered wildly between divergent and inconsistent approaches.”); 
Daniel E. Troy, Advertising Not "Low Value" Speech, 16 YALE J. REG. 85, 123 (1999) (arguing that “the subjective 
Central Hudson test . . . has produced an inconsistent Supreme Court commercial speech jurisprudence and sowed 
confusion in the lower courts. . . .”). 
7 See generally 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 514 (U.S. 1996).  
scrutinizing the vice regulations in the most recent cases.
8
  While the evolution of Central 
Hudson can be viewed as a victory for commercial speech, it also demonstrates a problem: the 
Central Hudson analysis may be so malleable and subjective that it can no longer effectively 
safeguard the First Amendment interests at stake.   
The Central Hudson issue becomes most concerning in the vice advertising context, 
where the government often has laudable interests in enacting legislation that restricts advertising 
certain products to certain groups of people or in certain locations. However commendable the 
government’s objectives may be, an encroachment on First Amendment freedoms demands 
consistent and scrupulous review by the judiciary, which the Supreme Court eventually made 
clear throughout the vice cases.
9
  Nevertheless, Central Hudson still leaves room to maneuver, 
and the Court has failed to agree on some important aspects of the analysis.
10
  These downfalls 
are evident in the Third and Fourth Circuits’ conflicting determinations when scrutinizing similar 
vice advertising restrictions.
11
 
This comment examines special issues within the vice advertising subset of the 
commercial speech doctrine.  Part II provides a history of the commercial speech doctrine, from 
its misunderstood inception to its analytical framework as set out in Central Hudson.  Part III 
focuses on the Supreme Court’s application and refinement of Central Hudson in vice 
advertising regulations.  Part IV explores the Third and Fourth Circuits’ application of Central 
Hudson to similar alcohol advertisement regulations in their respective circuits.  Part V analyzes 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision and its deviance from Supreme Court precedent and speculates on 
                                                
8 Compare Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) with Lorillard 
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
9 See infra note 6. 
10 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554 (“[S]everal Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson 
analysis and whether it should apply in particular cases.”). 
11 See discussion infra Parts IV, V. 
why such deviations are likely to occur.  Finally, Part VI summarizes the progression of Central 
Hudson’s application to vice advertising and opines on the future of the doctrine. 
II. Underpinnings of the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
 In a 1942 decision, the Supreme Court declared that advertising was not within the scope 
of the First Amendment.
12
  Whether the Court’s decision was “ill-conceived”13 or merely a sign 
of the times,
14
 commercial speech remained unprotected until the 1970s.  In Virginia Board, the 
Court recognized the value of commercial speech and the First Amendment interests at stake and 
expressly afforded constitutional protection to advertising for the first time.
15
  Central Hudson 
tied up Virginia Board’s loose ends by creating a four-pronged adaptation of intermediate 
scrutiny to assess the validity of regulations on commercial speech.
16
 
 A. The Pre-Protection Period 
 The Justices of the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, created the commercial 
speech doctrine in Valentine v. Chrestensen,
17
 whether they realized it or not.  Mr. Chrestensen, 
an entrepreneur, had attempted to promote his business by distributing handbills in the streets of 
New York City until Police Commissioner Valentine notified him that such activity was in 
violation of §318 of the Sanitary Code, which forbade distribution of commercial 
advertisements.
18
  Instead of taking his business elsewhere, a clever Chrestensen chose to print 
double-sided handbills, with one side remaining a commercial advertisement and the other side 
consisting of a political protest against the City Dock Department.
19
  The police restrained 
                                                
12 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
13 See infra text accompanying note 28.  
14 See infra text accompanying notes 23-26. 
15 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, (1976). 
16 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
17 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
18 Id. at 55. 
19 Id. 
Chrestensen from distributing his double-sided handbills and a lawsuit followed.
20
  In its 
decision, the Court laid the foundation for a brand new subclass of speech in one sentence:  “We 
are . . . clear that the Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely 
commercial advertising.”21  The Court did not cite any authority or discuss reasons for its 
assertion.  Moreover, the opinion was written, circulated, and approved by the Justices in only 
nine days, suggesting that this case was not a particularly important one.
22
   
Considering the significance of this case to the commercial speech doctrine, it is puzzling 
that the most esteemed judiciary in the country did not hesitate in concluding that commercial 
speech did not enjoy First Amendment protection.  It seems likely that the holding in Valentine 
has little to do with commercial speech as it is known today and a lot to do with the status of 
“advertising” in 1942.23  A mere five years after “the switch in time that saved nine” when the 
Court abandoned the notion of economic substantive due process, the Valentine Court would 
have been reluctant to strike down a state’s economic regulation.24  At that time, Chrestenson’s 
advertising was not viewed as speech, but rather as occupational activities subject to state 
regulation.
25
  In fact, the term “commercial speech” did not enter the courtroom vocabulary until 
the 1970s.
26
 
 Fortunately, the broad, hasty exclusion of commercial speech from constitutional 
protection was transient.  Justice Douglas, who was a member of the Valentine Court, later 
                                                
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 58. 
22 Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 
757 (1993). 
23 Kozinski, supra note 22, at 763 (suggesting the Court’s opinion appeared to address an economic due process 
issue, not a speech issue).  See also Troy, supra note 6, at 122. 
24 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (adopting rational basis review of 
economic legislation). See also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
25 Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54 (“Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the 
streets . . . are matters for legislative judgment.”). 
26 Kozinski, supra note 22, at 756.  
opined that the Court’s ruling was “casual, almost offhand . . . [a]nd it has not survived 
reflection.”27  He subsequently reiterated that the ruling was “ill-conceived” and contended that 
the commercial form or content of a publication should not render speech unprotected.
28
   
Several other Justices eventually joined Justice Douglas and began to express concern 
over the validity of Valentine’s holding in dissenting opinions.29  Meanwhile, the New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan
30
 and Pittsburgh Press holdings displayed the gradual erosion of Valentine.  
In Sullivan, the Court conveyed full First Amendment protection to an allegedly libelous, 
political statement even though it was a paid advertisement.
31
  Pittsburgh Press followed 
Sullivan’s lead, stating that the “critical feature” of Valentine’s handbill was that “it did no more 
than propose a commercial transaction.”32  While the Court’s decisions did not go so far as to 
abrogate the doctrine, they certainly qualified Valentine’s holding to “purely commercial 
advertising,” or speech that did not also include noncommercial elements.33   
The First Amendment’s protection of advertisements was somewhat recognized in 
Bigelow v. Virginia.
34
  The Court expressly limited Valentine to its facts, finding the case 
“obviously does not support any sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per se.”35  
The Court emphasized that the constitutionality of a speech regulation, regardless of how the 
speech is labeled, is to be determined by weighing the alleged governmental interest against the 
                                                
27 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas J., concurring). 
28 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 904-05 (1971) (Douglas J., concurring). 
29 See, e.g., Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314-15 & n.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by 
Stewart, Marshall & Powell, JJ.); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 
401 & n.6 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 404 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
30 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
31 Sullivan held that unlike the handbills in Valentine, the political advertisement at issue received full First 
Amendment protection because it conveyed information, opinions, and ideas. 376 U.S. at 266.  
32 Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385.  
33 Id.; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266. 
34 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
35 Id. at 819-20. 
First Amendment interests.
36
  Therefore, the court concluded advertisements are not exempt from 
the First Amendment’s purview.37  However, Bigelow went on to note that the advertisement at 
issue went beyond merely proposing a commercial transaction by including “factual material of 
clear public interest.”38  Because of this allusion to the advertisement’s noncommercial subject 
matter, a small gray area remained around speech that solely promoted commercial matters.  
 B. The Virginia Board Case  
If Bigelow was the death knell of Valentine, consider Virginia Board to be its funeral.  
The regulation at issue was a Virginia statute prohibiting the advertisement of prescription drug 
prices, aimed at protecting consumers by preserving the integrity of the pharmaceutical 
profession.
39
  Unlike Bigelow, the Court was now dealing with speech that was void of 
noncommercial elements, that did “no more than propose a commercial transaction,”40 and asked 
“whether this communication is wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment.”41 The 
Court answered that question in the negative and invalidated the statute, upholding First 
Amendment protection to pure commercial speech for the first time.
42
   
In making its decision, the Court reached three noteworthy conclusions.  Firstly, the 
Court stated that the First Amendment protects not only the right to speak, but also the right to 
receive information.
43
  Consequently, protected speech encompasses both the right to advertise 
and the right to receive the advertising.
44
  
                                                
36 Id. at 826. 
37 Id. at 825. 
38 Id. at 822. The Court highlighted that sections of the advertisement relayed factual information that was 
potentially valuable to a wide range of readers, namely that abortion was legal in New York. Id. 
39 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 752, 766 (U.S. 1976). 
40 Id. at 762. 
41 Id. at 761.  
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 756-57. 
44 Id. at 757. 
Second, the Court rejected that the State’s paternalistic motives in suppressing price 
information were sufficient to outweigh the First Amendment rights of the advertiser, the 
consumer, and society in general.
45
  As to the First Amendment interests at stake, the Court 
declared that the advertiser’s purely financial interest in the commercial speech does not rescind 
his or her constitutional protection.
46
  The consumer’s interest in “the free flow of commercial 
information” could be just as strong as his or her interest in receiving political information.47  
This particular interest was especially relevant in this instance because the individuals most 
affected by the price ban were the poor, the ill, and the elderly.
48
  Finally, the Court speculated 
that society, as part of a free enterprise economy, benefits from uninhibited dissemination of 
commercial information because it ensures that economic decision-making is well-informed.
49
   
The Court conceded that upholding the high standards of pharmacists and thereby 
protecting consumers was a strong interest, but was troubled by the implications of the State’s 
method.
50
  The Court reasoned that the ban had no direct effect on pharmacists’ professionalism, 
but instead operated on the presumption that consumers with the free flow of price information 
will make decisions against their own best interests.
51
  It went on to propose a different 
assumption: “information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best 
interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the 
channels of communication rather than to close them.”52  Neither the Court nor the legislature is 
entitled to choose between the two approaches because it is the First Amendment that makes the 
                                                
45 Id. at 770. 
46 Id. at 762. 
47 Id. at 763. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 766.  
50 Id. at 768-69. 
51 Id. at 769-70. 
52 Id. at 770. 
determination.
53
  Thus, Virginia could not maintain the standards of its pharmacists “by keeping 
the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering.”54   
Finally, the Court set out two “commonsense differences” between commercial speech 
and other forms of expression that “justified a different degree of protection . . . to insure that the 
flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.”55  First off, commercial 
speech is more objective than other forms of speech because it is easier to verify its accuracy.
56
  
Second, commercial speech is more durable than other types of speech because it essential to 
commercial profits.
57
  The Court suggested that such features “may make it less necessary to 
tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker.”58  These differences are 
meaningful because it is one of the few occasions in which the Court explained why commercial 
speech may be less deserving of full First Amendment protection.
59
  It also is worth noting that 
the Court sanctioned a different degree of First Amendment protection only for the purposes of 
achieving veracity,
60
 and not to allow the State to suppress information it may deem harmful.  
C. The Central Hudson Analysis 
Virginia Board’s call for a “different degree of protection” for commercial speech was 
answered by Central Hudson,
61
 the foundation of the modern commercial speech doctrine.  The 
majority opinion recapitulated prior commercial speech caselaw and a found that the cases 
developed a four-step judicial analysis for evaluating a restriction on commercial speech:
62
  “At 
                                                
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 772 n.24. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 KOZINSKI, supra note 1, at 634. 
60 Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 722 n.24 (“Even if the differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial 
speech is valueless . . . they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the 
flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.”(emphasis added)). 
61 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
62 Id. at 561-66. 
the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment.  For 
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not 
be misleading.”63  This prong reflects the view that the First Amendment seeks to protect the 
informational purpose of commercial speech, and therefore the Constitution permits suppression 
of deceptive or illicit commercial communication.
64
  “Next, we ask whether the asserted 
governmental interest is substantial.”65  If the first two criteria have been met, the analysis will 
move on to the third and fourth inquiries, which consider “whether the regulation directly 
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest.”66 
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Stevens, although concurring with the judgment, did 
not subscribe to the majority’s reasoning.67  Justice Blackmun denied that a lower level of 
judicial scrutiny is appropriate when the State seeks to outlaw accurate and lawful 
communication in order to depress consumer demand for a product.
68
  He found that 
governmental restraint on information regarding a legal product is “a covert attempt . . . to 
manipulate the choices of its citizens . . . by depriving the public of the information needed to 
make a free choice.”69  By avoiding direct regulation of the underlying commercial object, the 
government may shield its primary motives from the public eye and attain its ultimate goal by 
withholding information that its citizens need to make a voluntary choice.
70
  This modus 
operandi goes against the very essence of the First Amendment.
71
  Justice Blackmun also 
                                                
63 Id. at 566. 
64 Id. at 563-64. 
65 Id. at 566. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by Stevens, J). 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 574-75. 
70 Id. at 575. 
71 Id. 
criticized the majority’s interpretation of the cases from which the four-step test was derived.72  
The majority’s approach, allowing the State to suppress truthful, nonmisleading, and lawful 
commercial communication in order to manipulate public choices, is discordant with Virginia 
Board and the other Supreme Court precedent that the majority cited, all of which outright 
rejected such a proposition.
73
   
 Justice Stevens found little need to ruminate upon the majority’s test because he did not 
view Central Hudson as a commercial speech case.
74
  His concurrence illuminated one of the 
central problems with the doctrine: the difficulty of defining “commercial speech.”75  He 
analyzed two definitions described by the majority and found neither to be satisfactory.
76
  
Defining commercial speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the 
speaker and its audience" subsumes far too much expression that is entitled to the greatest degree 
of protection, such as utterances at a labor strike and an economist’s financial study.77  Neither 
the financial motives of the speaker nor the audience, in Justice Stevens’ view, should confine 
the constitutional protection afforded to the message.
78
  He found that the second definition, 
“speech proposing a commercial transaction," might be too constricted to be an adequate 
description.
79
  Regardless of how the term is defined, Justice Stevens stated that New York’s ban 
on “promotional advertising” effectively proscribed too many types of expression to fall within 
the commercial speech category.
80
   
 
                                                
72 Id. at 576-579 & n.3. 
73 Id. (citing Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)). 
74 Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
75 Id. at 579-80. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 579-80. 
78 Id. at 580. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 580-81. 
III. The Vice Cases 
Despite its shortcomings, the Central Hudson test was a step in the right direction.  The 
majority opinion solidified the protection given to commercial speech and assured a consistent 
analytical framework for reviewing commercial speech restrictions.  Or did it?  In the three 
decades since Central Hudson, the Supreme Court has dealt with First Amendment challenges to 
regulations on vice advertising six times, and the opinions demonstrate irresolute levels of 
scrutiny.
81
  In the early cases, Posadas and Edge Broadcasting, the Court unraveled the very core 
purposes of the commercial speech doctrine by deferring to paternalistic legislative goals and 
insinuating that vice advertising could be banned entirely.
82
  In the four cases that followed, 
Rubin, 44 Liquormart, Greater New Orleans, and Lorillard, the Court abandoned the rationale it 
adopted in the prior vice cases and became progressively more demanding of the government to 
sustain the evidentiary burdens of the third and fourth prongs.
83
  
A. The Early Cases 
In Posadas, the Supreme Court applied Central Hudson produced a 5-4 decision 
upholding Puerto Rico’s prohibition on casino advertisements targeting Puerto Rico citizens.84  
The legislature argued that the ban reduced residents’ demand for gambling and protected its 
citizens from gambling’s “serious harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare.”85  Finding 
that the speech was lawful and not deceptive and that Puerto Rico’s interest in the welfare of its 
                                                
81 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 
U.S. 173 (1999); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 
(1995); United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism 
Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
82 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
83 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
84 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344. 
85 Id. at 341. 
citizens was substantial, the Court went on to evaluate the relationship between the Legislature’s 
means and ends.
86
   
Posada’s majority opinion, written Justice Rehnquist, concluded that the regulation 
“clearly” furthered the government’s interest simply because the legislature reasonably believed 
casino advertisements would increase residents’ demand for gambling.87  The majority also 
“th[ought] it clear beyond peradventure” that the advertising prohibition was narrowly tailored to 
advance the legislature’s interests because the casinos were permitted to target tourists.88  The 
challenging casino asserted that the First Amendment obliges Puerto Rico to propagate counter-
speech to discourage gambling, rather than banning speech that may promote gambling.
89
  The 
Court again deferred to the legislature and dispelled the suggestion: “The legislature could 
conclude, as it apparently did here, that residents of Puerto Rico are already aware of the risks of 
casino gambling, yet would nevertheless be induced by widespread advertising to engage in such 
potentially harmful conduct.”90  In addition to greatly diminishing the force of the third and 
fourth prongs by yielding to the government’s judgments and protective motives, the majority 
found that a State’s power to proscribe an activity or product, especially vice products like 
cigarettes or alcoholic beverages, includes the lesser power to decrease demand for that object by 
suppressing speech.
91
  Justice Rehnquist asserted that it would be “a strange constitutional 
doctrine” to permit the state to entirely prohibit an activity but deny the state’s power to “forbid 
the stimulation of demand for the product or activity through advertising.”92   
                                                
86 Id. at 340-41. 
87 Id. at 342. 
88 Id. at 343. 
89 Id. at 344. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 345-46. 
92 Id. at 346. The majority’s “greater includes the lesser” rationale was not very well-received by the dissenters. Id. 
at 355 n.4 ((Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). As Justice Brennan poignantly noted, 
Seven years later, Edge Broadcasting exhibited another lenient application of the Central 
Hudson analysis.
93
  The Court upheld a federal lottery regulation that, among other things, 
prohibited broadcasters from advertising state lotteries unless the broadcaster was licensed in that 
state.
94
  In its commercial speech analysis, the Court declared that the third query of the Central 
Hudson test should consider whether the regulation directly advanced the government's 
legitimate interest in a general sense, regardless of whether it did so in a particular case.
95
  
Deferring to Congressional “commonsense judgment,” the Court established that the statutory 
ban directly pursued the interest in supporting the policies of lottery and nonlottery States.
96
  In 
regard to the final Central Hudson factor, the Court clarified that the "no more extensive than 
necessary" requirement of the test does not require a perfect fit between the restriction and the 
governmental interest, only a reasonable one.
97
  Suggesting that Congress could have banned all 
broadcast advertisements of lotteries, the Court concluded the ban was sufficiently narrow.
98
 
In essence, Posadas and Edge Broadcasting displayed the Supreme Court’s flimsiest 
application of Central Hudson yet.
99
  In both cases, the Court blindly assumed that the 
regulations furthered the asserted interests at stake, relying on nothing more than legislative 
speculation to pass the third prong of Central Hudson.
100
  Also, the Court in both instances 
determined the restrictions were narrowly tailored because they were not complete bans.
101
  
Finally, Posadas reasoned, and Edge Broadcasting agreed, that governmental ability to prohibit 
                                                                                                                                                          
lawful speech and not the act of gambling receives constitutional protection, and the “strange constitutional 
doctrine” prohibiting such speech bans is called the First Amendment.  Id.   
93 United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
94 Id. at 422. 
95 Id. at 430.  
96 Id. at 428. 
97 Id. at 357. 
98 Id. at 357. 
99 Since Posadas and Edge Broadcasting, the Court has required the State to meet higher evidentiary standards in 
the third and fourth prongs.  See infra Part III.B. 
100 See supra notes 90, 93, 99 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra notes 91, 101 and accompanying text. 
an activity translates into the power to constrain advertising about that activity.
102
  Remarkably, 
these two cases, the only “vice” cases between 1986 and 1993, were the only decisions that 
upheld regulations on commercial speech under Central Hudson.
103
  While First Amendment 
protection of commercial speech was flourishing in most areas, it certainly was dwindling in the 
“vice” subset of commercial expression. 
B.  The later cases 
In Rubin, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed to strike down a federal ban on 
disclosure of the alcohol content on beer labels as a means to prevent alcohol strength wars.
104
  
Slightly retreating from Posadas, the Rubin Court refused to concede that the government has 
greater freedom to regulate speech promoting “socially harmful activities” that could be 
banned.
105
  The Court duly noted that Posadas’ “greater includes the lesser” argument was not 
the basis for the Court’s decision upholding the ban, but came later in the opinion.106  The Rubin 
Court also refused to accept the government’s “common sense” theory,107 adopting a 
strengthened version of the Central Hudson’s third prong that required the government to 
“demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to 
a material degree."
108
  The overall irrationality of the regulatory scheme and the government’s 
failure to supply persuasive evidence prevented the restriction from directly advancing the 
                                                
102 See supra notes 94-95, 101 and accompanying text. 
103 See Michael Hoefges & Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, “Vice” Advertising under the Supreme Court's Commercial 
Speech Doctrine: The Shifting Central Hudson Analysis, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 345, 362 (2000). 
104Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995).  Justice Stevens is the only member of the Court who did 
not join the majority opinion.  Id. at 491 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).  He concurred reasoned that 
Central Hudson should not apply to a regulation that bans “truthful, unadorned, informative speech” to keep 
consumers uninformed.  Id. at 491, 496.  Justice Stevens later advocated this position when he wrote his plurality 
opinion in 44 Liquormart.  See 44 Liquormart v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 501-04 (1996). 
105 Rubin, 514 U.S. at 482 n.2. 
106 Id. 
107 The government attempted to pass the third prong by appealing to the common sense rationale, suggesting  “a 
restriction on the advertising of a product characteristic will decrease the extent to which consumers select a product 
on the basis of that trait.” Id. at 487. 
108 Id. 
substantial interest of preventing alcohol strength wars.
109
  The Court went on to reject the 
government’s position that the regulation was narrowly tailored because it was not a complete 
ban on alcohol content disclosures, an argument that the Court sustained in Posadas and Edge 
Broadcasting.
110
  Instead, the Court concluded that the statute was broader than necessary 
because Congress could have achieved its interest without implicating First Amendment 
rights.
111
  
 In its 44 Liquormart decision, the Court struck down a Rhode Island ban on price 
advertising for alcoholic beverages in four separate opinions.
112
  Justice Stevens penned the 
principal opinion and reaffirmed the stance he took in Rubin’s concurrence, which stressed the 
need to carefully scrutinize the government’s objectives in suppressing speech.113  An intention 
to protect consumers from deception or overreaching warrants less than strict scrutiny because it 
is consistent with the “commonsense distinctions” between commercial and noncommercial 
speech.
114
  But “bans that target truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages rarely protect 
consumers . . . . Instead, such bans often serve only to obscure an ‘underlying governmental 
policy’ that could be implemented without regulating speech.”115   
                                                
109 Id. at 488-89. The Court found the legitimacy of the government’s goal to be weakened by the statute’s other 
provisions, mandating the disclosure of alcohol content in wines and spirits and allowing brewers to label their 
product as “malt liquor.” Id.  Such inconsistencies would “ensure[] the labeling ban will fail to achieve [its] end.” Id. 
at 489.  
110 Id. at 490.  
111 Id. at 491. 
112 See 44 Liquormart v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 495-514 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J.); Id. at 517-18 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Id. at 518-28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment); Id. at 528-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
113 Id. at 501-504. See also supra note 104. 
114 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501-02. The “commonsense distinctions” are the greater objectivity and hardiness of 
commercial speech. Id at 502 (citing Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 771 n.24) (1976)). 
115 Id. at 502-03. 
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Souter, applied 
Central Hudson and first determined the first two prongs were met.
116
 Under the third prong, 
Rhode Island relied on the theory that a ban on prices would lead to higher prices for alcohol, 
which would in turn decrease consumption.
117
  Stevens found this conclusion to be speculative 
and insufficient to satisfy the third prong, which required the state to show evidence that the 
regulation significantly and directly furthered its goal.
118
  The fourth prong was equally fruitless 
for the state, as Stevens opined that it was "perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation 
that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to achieve the State's goal 
of promoting temperance.”119   
Justice O’Connor wrote the other major opinion in 44 Liquormart, joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Souter and Breyer.
120
  In applying Central Hudson, she did not 
feel the need to elaborate on the third prong because she concluded Rhode Island failed the 
fourth prong of the analysis.
121
  In accordance with Justice Stevens’ opinion, Justice O’Connor 
determined the regulation compelled an overly broad and needless restriction on truthful 
information because the state had various other means to directly achieve its goal.
122
  
Significantly, a majority of the 44 Liquormart Court expressly or impliedly rejected Posadas’ 
highly deferential approach and "greater includes the lesser" rationale, advocating for a more 
stringent judicial review of the government’s goals and speech restrictions.123 
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118 Id. at 505, 507. 
119 Id at 507. 
120 Id. at 528 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
121 Id. at 529. 
122 Id. at 130.  
123 Id. at 509-10 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was "up to the legislature" to 
choose suppression over a less speech-restrictive policy. . . . We also cannot accept the State's second contention, 
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(“Since Posadas, however, this Court has examined more searchingly the State's professed goal, and the speech 
In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, the Court struck down part of a federal regulation 
that, in part, banned broadcast advertising for private casinos.
124
  Stevens again wrote for the 
Court, this time with a majority of the Justices joining, and concluded that the government had 
failed to satisfy its evidentiary burdens under the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson.
125
  
In determining whether the regulation directly advanced the government’s interests, the Court 
drew attention to the government’s lack of empirical evidence and declined to accept the 
government’s “causal chain” hypothesis.126  However, the Court found an even bigger flaw was 
at hand.
127
  Examining the regulatory scheme as a whole, the Court found it was "so pierced with 
exemptions and inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it."
128
  
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the regulation was overly broad because the government 
had alternative, more direct measures to attain its goal in decreasing the harmful social effects of 
gambling.
129
  
In Lorillard, the Supreme Court invalidated Massachusetts’ outdoor and point-of-sale 
advertising restrictions on tobacco products.
130
  Stating that the first two prongs of Central 
Hudson were met, the Court addressed whether the regulations were narrowly tailored and 
directly advanced Massachusetts’ interests.131  To establish that the outdoor advertising ban 
would advance its interest, the state proffered various FDA and institutional studies to support 
                                                                                                                                                          
restriction put into place to further it, before accepting a State's claim that the speech restriction satisfies First 
Amendment scrutiny.). 
124 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176, 178 (1999). 
125 Id. at 176, 188-95. 
126 Id. at 189.  The government theorized that promoting casino gambling inflates demand, which stimulates the 
amount of gambling, producing detrimental social effects.  Id. 
127 Id. at 190. 
128 Id.  The statute forbade broadcast advertising about private casinos but contained exemptions for tribal casinos, 
government-operated casinos and non-profit casinos.  Id. 
129 Id. at 192.  
130  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 565-67 (2001).  The regulation prohibited outdoor advertisements 
for tobacco products within 1,000 feet of a school or playground and required point-of-sale advertisements to be at 
least five feet above the floor in stores located within 1,000 feet of a school or playground.  Id. at 561-62, 566. 
131 Id. at 555.  The state conceded that the speech was protected by the First Amendment and the state’s interest in 
restraining tobacco use by minors was substantial.  Id. 
the notion that “product advertising stimulates demand for products, while suppressed 
advertising may have the opposite effect.”132  The Court determined that although this evidence 
was sufficient to pass the third prong’s muster, “[t]he broad sweep of the regulations indicate[d] 
that the Attorney General did not ‘carefully calculate the costs and benefits associated with the 
burden on speech imposed’ by the regulations.”133  The regulation not only would have 
effectually banned tobacco ads in some metropolitan areas, but it also impermissibly infringed on 
the First Amendment interests of adult buyers and sellers alike.
134
  As to the point-of-sale 
advertising ban, the state could satisfy neither the third nor the fourth prong of Central 
Hudson.
135
  The five-foot height rule was futile because some children were below five-feet tall 
and the others could simply look up, and it was also insufficiently tailored.
136
 
In their entirety, the four aforementioned cases represent the Supreme Court’s significant 
turnaround in its attitude toward commercial speech.  The Court no longer surrenders to 
legislative discretion under the third prong, and instead demands that the government provide 
meaningful evidence to demonstrate the regulation directly advances its purpose. Further, a 
restriction will be invalid if the regulation or other statutory provisions contain exemptions that 
undermine the effectiveness of the regulation in achieving the asserted goal.  As to the fit 
between the restriction and the goal, the Court no longer upholds regulations if the government 
failed to consider or utilize non-speech alternatives.  Finally, a speech ban will be overly broad if 
                                                
132 Id. at 557-61.   
133 Id. at 561 (citing Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
134 Id. at 562-65 (“We must consider that tobacco retailers and manufacturers have an interest in conveying truthful 
information about their products to adults, and adults have a corresponding interest in receiving truthful information 
about tobacco products.  In a [previous] case . . . we explained that ‘the governmental interest in protecting children 
from harmful materials . . . does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.’”  
(citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997))). 
135 Id. at 566-67 (determining that “the blanket height restriction does not constitute a reasonable fit with that goal.) 
136 Id. 
it significantly violates the protected interests of others in disseminating and receiving 
commercial information. 
IV. The Third and Fourth Circuit Split in Applying Central Hudson to Vice Advertising 
 In the wake of the Supreme Court’s latest application of Central Hudson to vice 
advertising, two restrictions on alcohol advertisements in college publications were challenged 
under the First Amendment, Pitt News and Educational Media Co.  The Third and Fourth Circuit 
Courts of Appeals, respectively, evaluated the constitutionality of two similar state laws and 
applied the Central Hudson analysis in markedly different ways.   
A. The Third Circuit 
In 1996, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted an amendment to the Liquor Code known 
as “Act 199,” 137  which in relevant part applied the following to all alcoholic and malt beverage 
advertising:: “No advertisement shall be permitted, either directly or indirectly, in any booklet, 
program book, yearbook, magazine, newspaper, periodical, brochure, circular, or other similar 
publication published by, for or in behalf of any educational institution.”138  A violation of the 
statute resulted in a misdemeanor, punishable by fines up to $500 or imprisonment for 3 months 
on a first charge, and a minimum jail sentence of 3 months for subsequent offenses.
139
  While the 
history of the Act did not mention its purpose, the State claimed the relevant provision of the 
statute tackled both underage drinking and binge drinking by adults and minors on college 
campuses.
140
  The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB) interpreted the Act in Advisory 
Notice No. 15 and explained that advertisements in media that are distributed at a school, but that 
                                                
137 H.R. 2292, 180th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1996), 47 Pa. Cons. Stat. §4-498 (e)(5) (2002). 
138 47 PA. CONS. STAT. §4-498 (e)(5) (2002). 
139 47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4-494(a); See also Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 358 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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are otherwise not connected with the school, are permissible.
141
  In 1999, The Pitt News, a 
student-run newspaper at the University of Pittsburgh, sought to enjoin enforcement of Act 199 
after losing over $17,000 in advertising revenue as a result of the statute’s enactment.142   
The readers of The Pitt News consisted primarily of the university population, about 75% 
of which was of the legal drinking age.
143
  The paper was distributed for free and was available 
at 75 campus locations, along with other free, local newspapers that were not connected with the 
university.
144
  The Pitt News acquired revenue solely from advertising, and a substantial portion 
of this revenue came from alcohol ads before Act 199 took effect.
145
  After a local restaurant that 
had placed alcohol advertisements in The Pitt News was cited for a violation of the Act in 1997, 
the newspaper lost many advertising contracts.
146
  The paper unsuccessfully attempted to 
minimize the loss of revenue by encouraging liquor licensees to place ads unrelated to alcohol.
147
  
This proved to be unsuccessful, and The Pitt News was forced to shorten the newspaper and 
eliminate space for student speech after losing about $17,000 in income in 1998.
148
  The loss of a 
significant portion of its revenue also threatened the paper’s ability to purchase essential 
equipment and to effectively compete in the marketplace.
149
  As a result, the paper sued 
Pennsylvania state officials and claimed that Act 199 violated the First Amendment rights of the 
newspaper, its advertisers, and its adult readers.
150
 
                                                
141Advertising of Alcoholic Beverages in Pennsylvania, Pa. Liquor Control Bd. Advisory Notice No. 15 (4th 
Revision) (2007), available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/legal_issues/17503 (follow 
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The district court denied the paper’s request for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the 
enforcement of Act 199, finding that The Pitt News lacked standing because the paper suffered 
an indirect, economic injury.
151
  On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, finding that although The 
Pitt News had standing to bring its claim, it nevertheless did not show a likelihood of success on 
the merits of its claim.
152
  The court reasoned that Act 199 did not directly harm the newspaper, 
and the injury asserted by the paper was merely a secondary effect of a statute directed at the 
advertisers.
153
  Additionally, the regulation did not prevent The Pitt News from publishing 
information on alcoholic beverages so long as the paper did not get paid for it.
154
  Thus, the court 
concluded, the incidental injury caused by Act 199 was not an infringement on newspaper’s First 
Amendment rights.
155
 
Four years later, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment for the Commonwealth and found that Act 199 was unconstitutional as an 
impermissible restriction on commercial speech.
156
  The court’s opinion, written by Justice Alito 
before he joined the Supreme Court, first determined that the imposition of a financial burden on 
certain types of speech, what the court previously deemed an “incidental economic effect,”157 
was indeed a restriction on commercial speech subject to the Central Hudson test.
158
 Under the 
first prong, the Third Circuit found that the contemplated advertisements were not misleading 
and related to the legitimate sale of alcohol.
159
  The court then stated that the Commonwealth’s 
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152 Id. 
153 Fisher, 215 F.3d at 367. 
154 Id. at 366. 
155 Id. 
156 Pappert, 379 F.3d at 113. The 3rd Circuit also found that Act 199 was unconstitutional for another reason: the 
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159 Id. 
interests in minimizing underage and binge drinking were substantial.
160
  However, Act 199 
failed to satisfy the third and fourth prongs of the analysis.
161
   
Under the third prong, the State failed to prove that an advertising ban in a small segment 
of the media furthered its interests in curbing abusive and underage drinking.
162
  While the court 
acknowledged a general link between alcoholic beverage ads and increased consumption, it 
opined that the State could not rely on such a general connection when the Act did not “greatly 
reduc[e] the quantity of alcoholic beverage ads viewed by underage and abusive drinkers on the 
Pitt campus.”163  Despite the ban on ads in collegiate publications, the students would still be 
bombarded by alcohol ads in other media, such as the other local newspapers available for free 
next to The Pitt News.
164
  The State’s contention that abolishing alcohol ads in educational 
publications would stifle abusive and underage drinking was, in the court’s opinion, “counter 
intuitive and unsupported by any evidence” that the State proffered.165  
In evaluating the fourth prong, the court rejected that Act 199 was sufficiently tailored to 
combat problem drinking in college students for two reasons.
166
  The court first noted that a 
substantial majority of Pitt students were of the legal drinking age and so the regulation, like the 
one in Lorillard,
167
 infringed upon the rights of adults to receive accurate information pertaining 
to products they were permitted to buy.
168
  Second, the court declared that strictly enforcing 
consumption laws on college campuses was the most direct method of achieving the State’s 
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167 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
168 Pappert, 379 F.3d at 108. 
goals.
169
  The State did not establish that it utilized the more direct, non-speech alternative and 
thus did not demonstrate a reasonable fit between the Act and its goals.
170
   
Because the regulation could not meet the Central Hudson criteria, the court enjoined the 
State from enforcing Act 199 against The Pitt News advertisers.
171
  Furthermore, the PLCB cited 
to Pitt News in an Advisory Notice and a Legal Opinion, clarifying that the Third Circuit’s 
holding extended beyond just the alcohol ads in The Pitt News.
172
  The notice stated that “[u]ntil 
recently, colleges and universities were considered to be subject to the print advertisement ban 
affecting educational institutions,” but that the Third Circuit found the ban unconstitutional when 
applied to college newspapers.
173
  The official opinion issued in 2009 left little room for 
ambiguity when it advised a licensee that in light of the court’s ruling, “college print media is an 
open venue for alcohol advertisements.”174  The interpretations of Act 199 in the Advisory 
Notice and the Legal Opinion bind the board’s enforcement division,175 and consequently it 
seems that the Act’s prohibition on alcohol ads in college publications is no longer viable.  
B. The Fourth Circuit 
The Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control (“ABC”) Board issued the regulation at issue in 
the Fourth Circuit, 3 VAC 5-20-40(B)(3), which bans advertising beer, wine, or mixed drinks in 
college student publications unless the advertisement was for a dining establishment.
176
  A 
“college student publication” is defined as “any college or university publication that is prepared, 
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172 Advertising of Alcoholic Beverages in Pennsylvania, Pa. Liquor Control Bd. Advisory Notice No. 15 (4th 
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edited or published primarily by students at such institution, is sanctioned as a curricular or 
extra-curricular activity by such institution and which is distributed or intended to be distributed 
primarily to persons under 21 years of age.”177  Although dining establishments are permitted to 
advertise under the regulation, such advertisements could not refer to specific brands or prices 
and were limited to using the following terms: "A.B.C. on-premises," "beer," "wine," "mixed 
beverages," "cocktails," or a combination of the words.
178
  The suggested first offense penalty for 
violating the regulation is a $500 fine or a 7-day liquor license suspension.
179
  The ABC Board 
contended that the regulation, which had been in existence since at least the 1970’s, furthered the 
State’s interests in diminishing underage and binge drinking on college campuses. 180 
The Collegiate Times at Virginia Tech and The Cavalier Daily at the University of 
Virginia (UVA) were “college student publications” subject to 3 VAC 5-20-40(B).181  Both 
publications were distributed free of charge on their respective campuses and in the surrounding 
communities, generating revenue almost exclusively through advertising.
182
  Like the publication 
in Pitt News, both papers were available alongside competing, non-student run newspapers that 
were not subject to the regulation.
183
  The majority of readers of either publication was at least 
twenty-one years old.
184
  The Collegiate Times and The Cavalier Daily each approximated 
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annual losses of $30,000 in alcohol advertisement sales and asserted that the regulation was an 
impermissible restriction of commercial speech under the First Amendment.
185
  
The Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment for the newspapers, finding 
that 3 VAC 5-20-40(B) failed the Central Hudson test and hence violated the First 
Amendment.
186
  The court determined that the First Amendment afforded protection to alcohol 
advertisements in the publications, noting that the sale of alcohol is not inherently illegal and a 
majority of readers could lawfully purchase alcohol. 
187
 The plaintiffs stipulated, and the court 
agreed, that Virginia’s interest in reducing underage and excessive consumption of alcohol was 
substantial.
188
  The court’s focus then shifted to the third and fourth prong, where the 
Commonwealth of Virginia could not meet its evidentiary burden.
189
   
While assessing whether 3 VAC 5-20-40(B) alleviated problem drinking on college 
campuses, the district court stated that the absolute dearth of data regarding the regulation’s 
effect on underage or abusive drinking had created “an insurmountable barrier” to sustaining its 
validity.
190
  The court also refuted the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witness, who 
asserted that prohibiting alcohol advertisements in college newspapers would curb consumption 
because such newspapers are unique media outlets with no adequate substitutes.
191
  The court 
found his claim regarding the inimitability of college newspapers was unfounded, and further 
determined that his theory completely disregarded the media-saturated world that students live in 
today.
192
  The court, citing to Pitt News, refused to overlook the fact that 3 VAC 5-20-40(B) 
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closed off only one method of advertising, leaving a vast array of other forms of media 
unregulated.
193
 
The regulation’s inconsistencies and overly broad sweep led the Commonwealth to 
founder on the fourth prong.
194
  The Commonwealth argued that exception for dining 
establishments and the proscription of only specific words demonstrated that the law was 
narrowly tailored.
195
  The court rejected that assertion, pointing out some of the illogical 
outcomes of the regulation as it was written.
196
  Moreover, the ABC Board did not establish that 
it actually had contemplated these exceptions when creating the law, and the court was not keen 
to accept the Board’s “retrospective gloss” on the matter.197  The district court proceeded to 
mention the overabundance of persons affected by the restriction, many of whom have a First 
Amendment interest in receiving accurate information about alcohol products and distributors.
198
 
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, concluding that the ban on 
alcohol advertisements in college student publications passed the third and fourth prongs of the 
Central Hudson test.
199
  Judge Dennis Shepp, writing for the majority, stated that the regulation’s 
link to decreasing alcohol demand was “amply supported by the record.”200  He referred to the 
generally accepted connection between advertising and demand for products in judicial 
decisions
201
 and found the link was especially strong in this situation because college student 
publications are inimitable and are directed at college students.
202
  Judge Shepp also accepted the 
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Board’s claim that the link was further legitimized by commonsense; vendors would not want to 
advertise in college newspapers unless they believed the ads stimulated college students’ demand 
for alcohol.
203
   
As for the fourth prong, the majority found the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve 
the state’s “interest [in] establishing a comprehensive scheme attacking the problem of underage 
and dangerous drinking by college students.”204  The court supported this conclusion by stressing 
that the regulation did not apply to every college student publication, but only to those aimed at 
students under the age of 21.
205
  The law also permitted dining establishments to advertise the 
alcohol they serve.
206
  Judge Shepp emphasized that the ABC Board used the regulation as a 
“cost-effective” complement, not substitute, to other efforts combating underage and abusive 
drinking.
207
  He maintained that the Board would have to increase its alternative prevention 
efforts without the regulation, which would strain its already limited resources.
208
  Finally, the 
majority dismissed the newspapers’ claim that other non-speech methods could better curtail 
underage consumption, determining that the law need not be the best approach, only that it be 
reasonable to the governmental interest.
209
 
Judge Norman Moon, a district judge sitting by designation, dissented from the 
majority’s conclusion at length.210  Relying heavily on Pitt News, Judge Moon determined that 
the Board’s evidence regarding §5-20-40(B)(3)’s effect on underage drinking was “speculative, 
at best,” which is insufficient to satisfy the third prong.211  He noted that the Commonwealth’s 
                                                
203 Id. 
204 Id.   
205 Id. at 591. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. (Moon, J., dissenting). 
211 Id. at 592-93. 
own expert revealed that there was no evidence proving the ban advances the desired objective, 
and that the evidence suggested the college drinking problem had been worsening in spite of the 
inveterate regulation.
212
   Even if Judge Moon accepted the Board’s “commonsense” assertion 
that alcohol vendors advertise to increase demand by college students, he found that such a claim 
conflicts with the regulation directly advancing its purpose, which is to decrease underage and 
abusive drinking, not drinking in general.
213
   
Judge Moon followed up on the district court’s observation that the regulation’s 
exceptions created inconsistencies that discredited the Board’s narrow tailoring argument.214  
The regulation allowed a restaurant to promote “beer night” or “mixed drink night” but banned 
any advertiser from promoting things such as a wine festival or a “mojito night.”215  The Board 
did not provide any practical reason for allowing one kind of advertisement but not the other and 
Judge Moon questioned how a restriction could fit its purpose in reducing underage or excessive 
drinking when it permits the former advertisements but forbids the latter.
216
  He then reasoned 
that the regulation was not narrowly tailored because, in effect, it applied to newspapers that 
were mostly read by those 21 and older.
217
 
V. Analysis of the Circuit Split  
The divergent outcomes in the Third and Fourth Circuits illustrate the gaps in the third 
and fourth prongs of Central Hudson that have yet to be closed by the Supreme Court.  The 
Third Circuit’s assessment of Act 199 adopted the Supreme Court’s most recent holdings 
regarding the state’s evidentiary burdens.  Firstly, then Judge Alito refused to accept the general 
link between advertising and demand as adequate proof of direct advancement of the state’s 
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interest without more, consistent with Lorillard,
218
 Greater New Orleans,
219
 and 44 
Liquormart.
220
  In addition, the Third Circuit appreciated the logical loopholes in Act 199, which 
only banned alcohol advertisements in college newspapers and left alternate media outlets 
unregulated.
221
  This type of regulatory inconsistency rendered commercial speech restrictions 
invalid in Greater New Orleans
222
 and Rubin.
223
  While assessing the fit between Act 199 and 
the state’s interest, the Pappert court determined the restriction was overly broad as it infringed 
valuable First Amendment rights of adults.
224
  The Supreme Court similarly protected the speech 
interests of buyers and sellers in Lorillard, where it decided a government’s goal in protecting 
children does not validate an exceedingly extensive speech prohibition.
225
  Finally, the Third 
Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s trend by requiring that the state show it had utilized non-
speech alternatives in order to satisfy the fourth prong.
226
  In Greater New Orleans,
227
 44 
Liquormart,
228
 and Rubin,
229
 the Supreme Court focused on the availability of alternative, direct 
means of regulation. 
To the contrary, the Fourth Circuit displayed deference to the Virginia ABC reminiscent 
of Posadas and Edge Broadcasting.  Judge Shepp cited to the language in Lorillard to accept the 
state’s “history, consensus, and common sense” assertions to establish that the ban directly 
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advanced the goal.
230
  In doing so, the Fourth Circuit majority relied on the link between 
advertising and demand as support of the regulation’s effectiveness.  However, Lorillard’s 
holding made it clear that the Court did not solely rely on correlation between demand for a 
product and advertising because the state presented studies to support that claim.
231
  Similarly, 
the Fourth Circuit dismissed the statute’s gaping loophole for restaurants by declaring that “its 
limited exception for restaurants does not render it futile.”232  However, this exception seems 
similar to the exceptions found in the casino advertising ban for various types of casinos in 
Greater New Orleans, or the exceptions to the alcohol content ban for wines and spirits in Rubin.   
Under the narrow-tailoring prong, Judge Shepp was content that the speech restriction 
was narrowly tailored because it did not completely ban alcohol advertising in college 
newspapers.
233
  This reasoning emulated the Supreme Court’s analyses in Edge Broadcasting 
and Posadas.
234
  The Virginia ABC Board proffered no evidence that it had ever implemented 
alternative measures that its own expert recognized as more effective, anti-alcohol advertising 
and increased taxes on alcohol.
235
  Moreover, the Board also failed to establish that the speech 
restriction was a necessary ingredient to the effectiveness of its contemporaneous education and 
enforcement programs, as opposed to a convenient option.
236
  Allowing the legislature to choose 
a convenient, speech-prohibiting measure over a less restrictive policy was a hallmark of 
Posadas that was outright rejected in 44 Liquormart.
237
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VI. Conclusion: An Unclear Future for Vice Advertising 
         All in all, the Supreme Court has drastically altered its Central Hudson analysis, 
especially with respect to vice advertising cases, which went from being effectively outside the 
First Amendment’s protection in Posadas and Edge Broadcasting to receiving equal protection 
along with other forms of commercial speech.  The Court, however, remains ambivalent on how 
to apply the test when it comes to the sufficiency of evidence needed to establish "direct 
advancement" and “narrow tailoring.”  Aside from the ambiguities surrounding the third and 
fourth factors, the Central Hudson framework itself is extremely malleable as evidenced by the 
fact that the Supreme Court has utilized the same four-pronged approach for over 30 years to 
produce an entire spectrum of decisions.
238
 
The Fourth Circuit’s approach to the Central Hudson analysis was a considerable 
deviation from the Supreme Court's latest analyses of vice advertising regulations.  The court 
erred under the third prong by accepting the State’s deficient evidentiary record and by 
overlooking the inconsistent and irrational aspects of the regulatory scheme.
239
  In addition, the 
Fourth Circuit did not fully consider non-speech alternatives and First Amendment interests, 
which have been the focus of the Supreme Court's application of the narrow tailoring 
requirement.
240
 
The Fourth Circuit’s departure from the Supreme Court's recent application of the 
Central Hudson in vice cases may be a manifestation of the court’s desire to take a more 
deferential approach to government legislature concerning vice advertising’s effect on youth.   
On the other hand, it is possible that the court was simply a victim of the overwhelming amount 
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239 See discussion infra Part V. 
240 Id. 
 
of conflicting language in Supreme Court opinions over the past two decades, all of which 
remain valid as Central Hudson still controls.  Either way, the Central Hudson framework 
permits lower courts to reach the opposite conclusion when faced with similar laws.  This 
jeopardizes one of society’s most unique and fundamental rights and should be resolved by the 
Supreme Court, either by overruling Central Hudson and providing full First Amendment 
protection to commercial speech, or by clarifying the specific hurdles the government must 
overcome under the third and fourth prongs of the analysis.            
 
